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Organization and Strength of the Communist Combat
and Administrative Service Units Subordinate to the B-3 Front

1. A Communist finance document captured by US forces on May 6 in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia, lists all combat and administrative service units subordinate to the B-3 Front and gives their strengths as of April 1970. These units are carried in the order of battle as all North Vietnamese.*
2. The document lists a total of more than 21,000 personnel. However, some sick and wounded in the hospitals listed in the table are included in the total. If deleted, the actual number is closer to 20,000 men. Of the 20,000, approximately 11,000 are combat forces and nearly 9,000 are administrative service personnel. Our estimates as for March 1970 reflected a total Communist strength of about 9,000 men, of which 6,600 are combat and nearly 2,500 are administrative service personnel. A unit by unit comparison between the documents and our listings is attached.
3. The major difference in the number of combat forces results from the higher unit strengths listed in the document; nearly all the combat units listed previously had been identified. For administrative services, however, the differences result from both higher unit strengths as well as a larger structure than what we have been estimating.
4. Although we may have simply understated unit strengths, it is also possible that these strengths may be the result of recently received NVA replacements. A more important problem with the strength figures, however, may be found in the fact that unit strengths listed in finance documents often are considerable higher than actual unit strengths because they are used for planning purposes for such things as food and clothing. Other

*VC combat and administrative service units which operate in the B-3 Front area are not directly subordinate to the Front but to the province headquarters of Gia Lai, Kontum, and Dac Lac. The Front, however, indirectly maintains operational control over these VC units through the respective province headquarters.

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captured documents and prisoner reports, however, indicate higher, as well as lower, strengths, suggesting that the writer may have used both actual as well as authorized strengths, depending on which was more readily available.

5. The document lists both a 40A and 40B Artillery Regiment with a combined strength of 1,790 men. We carry a 40th Regiment with 3 battalions and a strength of only 850 men. Two headquarters elements of the 40th and at least three new battalions of the unit have recently been identified. In addition, another document, dated May 1970, reveals that the 40th Regiment consists of as many as eight battalions with a total strength of 1,964 men. However, these two additional battalions possibly are units which we already carry that simply have been resubordinated to the 40th Regiment for tactical purposes.

6. The document also suggests that our present organizational listings of the 24th Regiment may be incorrect. Presently, we carry the 24th Regiment with two subordinate battalions, the 4th and the 6th. The 5th Battalion which was formerly subordinate to the 24th Regiment is carried as an independently detached battalion. The document lists the strength of the 24th Regiment as well as a separate listing of the strengths of the 5th and 6th Battalions. This separate listing suggests that the 6th Battalion also may have been separated from the 24th Regiment and, like the 5th, may now be operating independently. According to our present listing, this would leave the 24th Regiment with only one battalion. However, additional documents suggest that the 24th may have acquired at least one new battalion, the 7th. This would mean the 24th Regiment now has at least two battalions in addition to the 5th and 6th. The net result is the probable addition of at least one new combat battalion to the B-3 Front.

7. In addition, the document indicates that we probably have understated some unit strengths and not picked up a considerable number of logistical, training, and medical personnel of the B-3 Front. We do not carry a 27th NVA Engineering battalion, Binh

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Tram Bon (one of four Binh Trams subordinate to the Front), or several training schools. In addition, while we were aware of the existence of the three other Binh Trams, we have not carried any strength for them because of the lack of information on the nature and extent of their functions. The document lists these three Binh Trams with an aggregate strength of about 2,500 men. Another recent captured document cites the aggregate strength of these ^{THREE} Binh Trams at about 2,000 men, which tends to confirm the aggregate size of these units. Other differences between the document and our estimates are found in the strengths carried for transportation and medical elements of the B-3 Front. Our strengths of the transportation units are much lower than those listed in the document, although we actually carry two more battalions than listed (the two others we carry are believed to be aka's for the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions). Our estimates of the strength of the medical elements also appear somewhat low. However, there is some question about the apparently high strengths indicated for some medical units listed, particularly the V211 and V1 Hospitals. These units are not believed to include sick and wounded as the document clearly lists the strength of these personnel separately.

8. Despite all the problems with the specific strengths of individual units, this document and a number of other supporting documents provides the Intelligence Communist with a much clearer picture of the structure of Communist combat and administrative service forces in the Front and indicates that our previous estimates of its aggregate strength were considerably understated. In addition, other documents indicate the probable existence of several units of the Front not listed in the basic document or in our estimate, including a transportation battalion and a food production regiment. Considering all factors we believe that the aggregate strength listed in the document represents a good estimate of the total personnel of the Front.

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Comparative Listing of VC/NVA Combat Forces
Subordinate to B-3 Front

	<u>Doc (Apr 70)</u>	<u>Estimate (Mar 70)</u>
24th NVA Inf Regt	1,308	750
28th NVA Inf Regt	1,769	1,200
40A NVA Arty Regt)		
40B NVA Arty Regt)	1,790	850 (Carry 1 regt, 3 bns; however, unit recently appears to have picked up at least 3 new bns)
66th NVA Inf Regt	1,790	1,000
95B NVA Inf Regt	1,182	750
K20 NVA Sap Bn (Possible AKA for the 120th Sap Bn)	304	200
K28 NVA Recon Bn	263	150
K37 Sap Bn	259	300
5th NVA Inf Bn (Detached from 24th Regt)	383	250
6th NVA Inf Bn (Possibly detached from 24th Regt)	539	(250) (Carry as part of 24th Regt)
80th NVA Sap Recon Bn	354	450
K631 NVA Arty Bn	491	300
K394 NVA Arty Bn	593	400
Total	<u>11,025</u>	<u>6,600</u>

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	<u>Doc (Apr 70)</u>	<u>Estimate (Mar 70)</u>
Hq. & Staff, B-3 (includes Hq. B-3; MI Unit; Poli, & Rear Svc Staffs)	995	825
K25 NVA Engr Bn	180	200
K26 NVA Signal Bn	431	225
K27 NVA Engr Bn	244	Not carried
Military-Political Tng School	473	Carried as part of the strength of the Front's Hq & Staff
3 other Tng schools	196	Not carried
Central Hospital	177	Not carried
K22 Hospital	95	Not carried
K23 Hospital	110	Not carried. May be AKA for 3rd Medical Bn
V211 Hospital	478	150
V1	247	Carried as part of the strength of the Hq & Staff of Kontum Province
DT3 Med Unit	112	Not carried) Carry a) province) dispensary) as part of) the strength) of the Gia) Lai Prov
DT4 Med Unit	98	Not carried) Hq. & Staff

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	<u>Doc (Apr 70)</u>	<u>Estimate (Mar 70)</u>
V2 Hospital	Not listed. May be AKA for the K22 Hospital	100
Hospital 84	Not listed. May be AKA for the Central Hospital	150
3rd Med Bn	Not listed	200
D2 Trans Bn	410	125
D5 Trans Bn	381	125
D6 Trans Bn	283	Not carried. May be AKA for one of following bns.
D7 Trans Bn	388	Not carried. May be AKA for one of following bns.
D3 Trans Bn	Not listed	125
D4 Trans Bn	Not listed	125
17th Trans Bn	Not listed	125
509th Trans Bn	Not listed	125
X6 Unidentified Unit	222	Not carried
Binh Tram Bac	1,062) Existence known but no) specific strength) assigned to the indi-) vidual BT's because of) lack of information
Binh Tram Trung	846	
Binh Tram Nam	631	
Binh Tram Bon	466	
Small Misc Units	463	Not carried

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	<u>Doc (Apr 70)</u>	<u>Estimate (Mar 70)</u>
Total	<u>8,988</u>	<u>2,600</u>
Grand Total		
Combat & Adm Svc	<u>20,013*</u>	<u>9,050</u>

*Docuemnt gives the total as 21,067. The difference is due to the counting of sick and wounded personnel in the hospitals which have been omitted from the listing above.

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